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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
This case arises from the attempted suicide of inmate I. C.-T. ("Patient") housed in the

Ada County Jail in March of 2014, who was released from the Ada County's Sheriff's custody
pursuant to a court order on April 4, 2014. Specifically, the issue presented concerns payment of
a portion of the medical bills incurred by the Patient at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
("Saint Alphonsus") as a result of the suicide attempt. Saint Alphonsus alleges that Ada County
is responsible for payment of the entirety of the Patient's medical bills pursuant to Idaho Code
§§ 20-605, 20-612 and 31-3302(3). While Ada County 1 agrees that the Ada County Sheriff is

liable for payment of the medical bills incurred while the Patient was in his custody and
committed to the Ada County Jail, and in fact the Sheriff paid those bills, they disagree that
Idaho Code§§ 20-605, 20-612 and 31-3302(3) create any liability for the remainder of the bills,
and argue that they are not liable for any medical bills incurred after the court-ordered release of
the Patient from the Sheriffs custody and the dismissal of the criminal charges against him.

B.

Course of Proceedings.
On March 26, 2015, Saint Alphonsus filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory

Judgment and Complaint for Damages ("First Complaint") against the Ada County Sheriff's
Office, Ada County and the Board of Ada County Commissioners. R., pp. 7-31. Saint Alphonsus
later amended the First Complaint ("Amended Complaint") to remove the Ada County Sheriff's
Office as a defendant, and added Ada County Sheriff Gary Raney2 as a defendant. R., pp. 32-42.
Ada County filed its Answer to Plaintiffs Verified First Amended Complaint for Declaratory
1

The Defendants-Respondents are collectively referred to as "Ada County" in this Response
Brief.
2
Since the filing of this lawsuit, Sheriff Raney has retired from office, and the new Ada County
Sheriff is Steve Bartlett.

Judgment and Complaint for Damages on May 15, 2015. R., pp. 43-52.
After engaging in discovery, the parties ultimately filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, along with supporting briefs and affidavits, in August of 2016. R., pp. 53-258. The
District Court held a hearing on the motions on September 14, 2016. T., pp. 6-65. On October
25, 2016, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment, and granted Ada County's motion and denied Saint Alphonsus' motion. R.,
pp. 259-268. The District Court concluded, "There is no authority requiring a county to pay for
the expenses of a prisoner once the prisoner is released from custody. Nothing in the statutes
provides for payment of a prisoner's medical expenses incurred once the person is no longer a
prisoner." R., p. 265. Judgment was entered for Ada County on March 2, 2017. R., pp. 269-270.
Saint Alphonsus filed this appeal on April 11, 2017. R., pp. 271-275.

C.

Undisputed Facts.
On January 20, 2014, the Patient was arrested in Ada County by the Boise City Police

Department and charged with one misdemeanor count of Domestic Battery or Assault
Enhancement - In the Presence of a Child, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-918(4), case no. CRMD-2014-0000913. R., p. 79; p. 33, 1 5. The Patient was booked into the Ada County Jail on
the same date. R., p. 79. The Patient was arraigned on January 21, 2014, during which he
entered a not guilty plea, and bond was set at $1,000. R., p. 17. Also on that date, the Patient
was placed on an Immigration Detainer by the Department of Homeland Security. R., p. 80; pp.
82-84.
The Patient did not post bond and remained in the custody of the Ada County Sheriff. On
March 26, 2014, while still in the custody of the Ada County Sheriff and housed in the Ada
County Jail, the Patient was arrested by the Boise City Police and charged with three felony

2

counts of Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under the Age of 16, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-1506. R.,
p. 81. The Patient's video arraignment for these felony charges was scheduled for March 27,
2014 at 1:30 p.m. Id.
On March 27, 2014, prior to his arraignment, the Patient attempted suicide by hanging
himself. R., p. 34, ,i 8. The Patient was taken by the Ada County Paramedics to Saint Alphonsus
in critical condition. Id.
On April 3, 2014, in case no. CR-MD-2014-0000913, the Patient's pre-trial hearing was
reset to May 8, 2014, with the court noting:
Please reset 30 days out. Defendant was recently charged with FE (3 counts) and
while in custody Defendant attempted suicide and is still in hospital care.
Defendant is expected to live, but long term health is in question. State moves to
ROR today.
R., p. 22. Also on April 3, 2014, in the same case, the magistrate judge issued an Order of
Release, which reads:
TO THE SHERIFF OF ADA COUNTY OF THE STATE OF IDAHO: IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named Defendant be released from custody
this case only.
R., p. 23.

The next day, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office filed in case no. CR-FE2014-0004295 an Ex-Parte Motion to Release Defendant on His Own Recognizance.
Motion states:
A Complaint and Warrant were served on the Defendant, but before he could be
arraigned on the charges, the Defendant attempted suicide. The Defendant is
currently in critical condition at St. Alphonsus Hospital connected to a breathing
tube. The State has been informed that the hospital personnel hope to transfer the
Defendant to another facility at this time and are unable to determine if he will
make a full recovery. The State anticipates that releasing the Defendant ROR at
this time will allow his family to make necessary medical decisions and facilitate
the transfer of the Defendant.
The State intends to immediately seek
reimbursement of the bond should the Defendant's condition improve to the point

3

The

where he can be released from a medical care -facility and arraigned on the current
charges. The Defendant's speedy trial rights have not begun to run as he has yet
to be arraigned.
R., pp. 19-20. That same day, Magistrate Judge James Cawthon signed an Order of Release in
Case No. FE-2014-0004295, which reads:
TO THE SHERIFF OF ADA COUNTY OF THE STATE OF IDAHO: IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named Defendant be released from custody
ROR. This case only.
R. p. 21. As of this moment, the Patient was no longer in the custody of the Ada County Sheriff,
and was no longer committed to the Ada County Jail.
On May 5, 2014, in case no. CR-FE-2014-0004295, the Ada County Prosecuting
Attorney's Office filed a Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice, which reads in part:
A Complaint and Warrant were served on the Defendant, but before he could be
arraigned on the charges, the Defendant attempted suicide. The Defendant was in
critical condition at St. Alphonsus Hospital connected to a breathing tube, and
although he has somewhat physically improved, he is still housed at the hospital.
The State has been informed that the hospital personnel hope to transfer the
Defendant to Mexico for long-term care through the Mexican consulate. At this
time it is unknown when or even if the Defendant will ever be competent to stand
trial. The Defendant is in the country illegally and St. Alphonsus is eager to have
him transferred to his native country. Should the Defendant return to the United
States or be found competent to stand trial, the State anticipates refiling the
charges.
R., pp. 24-25. On May 9, 2014, in the same case, the court issued an Order to Dismiss Without
Prejudice, which reads:
THE COURT, having received the State's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to a
Motion to Dismiss filed by the State, does hereby Order that the Complaint filed
on or about March 27, 2014, in the above captioned case be dismissed without
prejudice due to the Defendant's physical and mental condition as represented by
the State which requires the Defendant to be in a long-term care facility located in
Mexico as arranged by the Mexican consulate.
R., p. 26.

4

On May 24, 2014, the Patient was discharged from Saint Alphonsus. 3 R. pp. 35-36,, 13.
The Ada County Sheriffs Office authorized payment of all of the Patient's medical bills
at the allowed rate from March 27, 2014, through April 4, 2014, the date on which the Patient
was ordered released from the Ada County Sheriffs custody. R., p. 92,, 4. These payments
totaled $67,568.84. Id. The charges incurred by the Patient after he was released from custody
were not paid since, as recognized by the District Court, Ada County and the Ada County Sheriff
have no such legal obligation.

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

There are no additional issues presented on appeal.

III.

STAND ARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court utilizes the same standard as
the district court. Farmers National Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 855, 318
P.3d 622, 624 (2014). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P.
56(c). "Ifthere is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question oflaw remains, over which
this Court exercises free review." Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., 147 Idaho
737,746,215 P.3d 457,466 (2009) (citations omitted).
IV.

ARGUMENT

The primary statutes at issue in this case are Idaho Code §§ 20-604, 20-605, 20-612 and
31-3302(3). Section 20-604 reads in its entirety:
3

On September 3, 2014, the Board of Ada County Commissioners upheld the Initial
Determination Denial for County Assistance in the Patient's application for medical indigency
assistance. R., p. 75. St. Alphonsus was a Third Party Applicant in the indigency case, and did
not seek judicial review of the final determination as provided in Idaho Code § 31-1506. Id.
5

Any district judge or magistrate may order a person confined or detained, upon
any grounds provided by law, in any county or municipal jail or other
confinement facility within the judicial district in which the court is located. Such
order may thereafter be amended to transfer such person from such jail or facility
to another at any place within the judicial district. If the county in which the court
is located has made an agreement with another governmental unit or agency
located outside the judicial district for the confinement or detention of persons,
then any district judge or magistrate acting in that county may also order a person
confined or detained outside of the judicial district in the confinement facility or
jail described in such agreement. All persons, officers and officials in charge of a
jail or confinement facility shall accept a person for detention or confinement
upon receiving a certified copy of an order made pursuant to this section.
Idaho Code § 20-605 establishes the reimbursement scheme applicable to inmates housed
in another county. This section reads:
The county wherein any court has entered an order pursuant to section 20-604,
Idaho Code, shall pay all direct and indirect costs of the detention or confinement
of the person to the governmental unit or agency owning or operating the jail or
confinement facilities in which the person was confined or detained. The amount
of such direct and indirect costs shall be determined on a per day per person basis
by agreement between the county wherein the court entered the order and the
county or governmental unit or agency owning or operating such jail or
confinement facilities . In the absence of such agreement or order fixing the cost as
provided in section 20-606, Idaho Code, the charge for each person confined or
detained shall be the sum of thirty-five dollars($ 35.00) per day, plus the cost of
any medical or dental services paid at the rate of reimbursement as provided in
chapter 35, title 31, Idaho Code, unless a rate of reimbursement is otherwise
established by contract or agreement; provided, however, that the county may
determine whether the detained or confined person is eligible for any local, state,
federal or private program that covers dental, medical and/or burial expenses.
That person will be required to apply for those benefits, and any such benefits
obtained may be applied to the detained or confined person's incurred expenses,
and in the event of the death of such detained or confined person, the county
wherein the court entered the order shall pay all actual burial costs. Release from
an order pursuant to section 20-604, Idaho Code, for the purpose of a person
receiving medical treatment shall not relieve the county of its obligation of paying
the medical care expenses imposed in this section. In case a person confined or
detained was initially arrested by a city police officer for violation of the motor
vehicle laws of this state or for violation of a city ordinance, the cost of such
confinement or detention shall be a charge against such city by the county
wherein the order of confinement was entered. All payments under this section
shall be acted upon for each calendar month by the second Monday of the month
following the date of billing.

6

Idaho Code§ 20-612 applies to inmates housed within the same county, and provides as
follows:
The sheriff must receive all persons committed to jail by competent authority
except mentally ill persons not charged with a crime and juveniles. It shall be the
duty of the board of county commissioners to furnish all persons committed to the
county jail with necessary food, clothing and bedding, and medical care as
provided in section 20-605, Idaho Code, and the board of county commissioners
is authorized to pay therefor out of the county treasury under such rules and
regulations as they may prescribe.
Finally, Idaho Code § 31-3302(3) reads:
The expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with or
convicted of crime and committed therefor to the county jail. Provided that any
medical expenses shall be paid at the rate of reimbursement as provided in chapter
35, title 31, Idaho Code, unless a rate of reimbursement is otherwise established
by contract or agreement.
These statutes are unambiguous, 4 and a plain reading shows that they do not support the
position taken by Saint Alphonsus in this case - that counties are financially responsible for the
payment of an inmate's medical bills even after that inmate has been released from custody by a
judge and is no longer committed to the county jail.
The District Court was correct that there is simply no statutory authority requiring a
4

This Court has clearly defined the requirements of statutory interpretation used to determine
whether a statute is ambiguous.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.
Such intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue. Statutory
interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, and this language should
be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the statutory language is
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given
effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory
construction.
Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 856, 318 P.3d 622, 625 (2014) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). If the intent is clear from the literal words of the statute, it will be deemed
unambiguous, and courts need not look any further. As this Court has further instructed, ''the
fact that two different interpretations of a statute are presented does not alone make a statute
ambiguous." Id.

7

county to pay for the medical bills on an inmate once he is released from custody and is no
longer committed to the county jail. Further, there is no independent theory of recovery under
Idaho Code§§ 20-605, 20-612 or 31-3302(3), nor is there any provision in these statutes that
requires payment to be made to a third-party provider such as a hospital. Saint Alphonsus would
have this Court add requirements to the statutes that do not exist. Absent the liability of a county
arising from medical bills incurred during an inmate's custody, there is no theory of recovery
available to Saint Alphonsus.

A.

This Court has Already Held that § 20-605 only Applies to the Housing of Out-ofCounty Inmates.
Idaho Code § 20-605 is a reimbursement statute that only applies when one county's

inmate is held in a neighboring county's jail. 5 This Court reached that determination in County

ofBannock v. Pocatello, 110 Idaho 292, 715 P .2d 962 (1986). 6 In that case, this Court was asked
to decide the extent to which the City of Pocatello was liable to Bannock County for
incarceration costs at the Bannock County Jail. Bannock County brought the lawsuit against the
City of Pocatello regarding the nonpayment of costs for housing persons in the Bannock County
Jail for violations of Pocatello city ordinances, motor vehicle violations, and other misdemeanor
offenses. Id., p. 293, 963. The City of Pocatello denied any liability except for the expenses
arising from the detention of violators of city ordinances. 7 Id.
This Court ruled that § 20-605 could not be examined in a vacuum, and thoroughly
considered ''the statute's history and its evolution through amendment." Id., p. 294, 964. This

5

The District Court below held that "Section 20-605 only applies to inmates housed in a different
county." R., p. 264.
6
A point also correctly recognized by the District Court. R., p. 264.
7
Historically, Bannock County was reimbursed by the City of Pocatello pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 50-302A, which was enacted in 1970. The parties' conflicting interpretations of§ 20-605,
which was enacted in 1973, gave rise to the lawsuit. County ofBannock v. Pocatello, 110 at 293,
963 .
8

Court noted that the 1973 amendment of§§ 20-604, 20-605 and 20-606 "broadened the authority
of the courts to send prisoners outside the county where they were charged by enabling a judge
to order the confinement of prisoners in other non-contiguous counties." Id. This Court then
referred specifically to §§ 20-604 and 20-605:
LC. § 20-604, as amended, enables a district judge or magistrate to order
prisoners confined in any county jail in ~at judicial district, or in any other
county if an agreement to that effect exists between the counties. IC. § 20-605,
as amended, defines which county is responsible for the cost ofjailing prisoners
in another county.
Id. (emphasis added).

This Court went on to discuss the interplay of these statutes with Idaho Code § 20-612,
and provided its determination of the meaning of the statutes:
That LC. §§ 20-604, -605 and -606 only regulate the city's and the county's
responsibility for prisoners housed in counties other than those in which the city is
situated, becomes apparent when one considers that I.C. § 20-612 was not
amended in 1973, but remains in effect today. As noted above, I.C. § 20-612
places on the county commissioners the complete duty to pay, with county funds,
for all prisoners housed in that county. To interpret LC. § 20-612 as the county
does would require that we ignore I.C. § 20-612 presumably because LC. § 20605 has superseded I.C. § 20-612 . . . . A more reasonable alternative to the
county's interpretation is that LC. §§ 20-604, -605 and -606 are specific statutes
which pertain only to the housing of prisoners in another county, while LC. § 20612 applies to prisoners housed within the county.
Id., p. 295, 965 (emphasis in original).

The ruling in the County of Bannock case is clear8 - §§ 20-604 and 20-605 are specific
statutes which pertain only to the housing of prisoners in another county. Given this statutory
framework, Idaho Code §§ 20-604 and 20-605 simply do not apply in this case. Both of the
Patient's arrests happened in Ada County by the Boise City Police Department. The Patient was
housed in the Ada County Jail, and the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District located in

8

ln its Appellant's Brief, Saint Alphonsus offers no argument as to why the County of Bannock
case is not controlling.
9

Ada County had jurisdiction over him. The Patient was not an out-of-county inmate, rendering
these statutory provisions inapplicable.
Importantly, Saint Alphonsus has now conceded that "§ 20-605 governs out-of-county
inmates." Appellant's Brief, p. 17. Saint Alphonsus' contradictory arguments are therefore
futile. Idaho Code § § 20-604 and 20-605 clearly do not create any liability on the part of Ada
County to pay for the Patient's medical bills incurred after he was released from custody by the
court, and the outstanding charges against him were dropped.

B.

As Held by the District Court, the 1994 Amendment to § 20-605 does not Alter this
Court's Ruling in County of Bannock v. Pocatello.
In 1994, the Idaho legislature amended § 20-605 to add the following: "Release from an

order pursuant to section 20-604, Idaho Code, for the purpose of a person receiving medical
treatment shall not relieve the county of its obligation of paying the medical care expenses
imposed in this section." The addition of this sentence, however, does not alter the application
of§§ 20-604 and 20-605.
As argued above, this Court succinctly held that "LC. §§ 20-604, -605 and -606 are
specific statutes which pertain only to the housing of prisoners in another county.... " County of

Bannock v. Pocatello, 110 at 295, 965.

Therefore, the entirety of § 20-605 concerns the

obligation of one county to reimburse another county for housing its inmates. By adding this
sentence into the middle of§ 20-605, the legislature did not change the overall application of the
statute. "It is assumed that when the legislature enacts or amends a statute it has full knowledge
of the existing judicial decisions and case law of the state." State v. Perkins, 135 Idaho 17, 21,
13 P.3d 344, 348 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho
537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990)).

The legislature certainly could have included the

sentence in a different statute. However, the legislature specifically chose to add the sentence in

10

§ 20-605. The legislative intent, ascertained from a plain reading of the statute, is not what Saint
Alphonsus says it is. Rather, it was to have the amendment apply in situations where one county
is housing an out-of-county inmate, and reimbursement of the associated costs is necessary. 9

In addition to the legislature's inclusion of the sentence in § 20-605, an examination of
the sentence itself supports the conclusion that the amendment only applies to the housing of
inmates in another county. First, the term "shall not relieve the county" refers to the county in
which the inmate originated and received the§ 20-604 order, meaning, the originating county is
not relieved of its obligation to reimburse the housing county for medical care expenses imposed
by § 20-605. In other words, the originating ,county still has to reimburse the housing county for
the person's already-incurred medical expenses.
Second, and also important to the analysis, is the language "imposed by this section,"
meaning, the obligation imposed by§ 20-605. The only obligation imposed by § 20-605 is the
obligation of the originating county to reimburse the housing county for costs already incurred,
not future costs incurred after release from a sheriff's custody.
Prior to the 1994 amendment, § 20-605 said nothing about the payment of future medical
bills incurred after an inmate is released from custody. The statute only spoke to the direct and
indirect costs of the detention or confinement of the person. Future medical bills of a person no
longer in custody were not contemplated to be costs that any county must pay. The obligation
imposed by § 20-605 prior to the 1994 amendment was for the originating county to reimburse
the housing county for expenses related to the confinement of its inmates.
The statutory amendment in 1994 did not expand this obligation to include future medical
9

The legislature would not have inserted this sentence into the middle of § 20-605 with the intent
to have it apply in situations beyond the scope of§ 20-605, at least without explicitly stating its
intention to do so. While Saint Alphonsus may wish that the legislature broadened the scope of
this statute to the benefit of third party medical providers, this simply was not accomplished by
the 1994 amendment.
11

expenses incurred after detention or confinement ends. 10 A plain reading of the statute supports
this conclusion. If an inmate is released in order to receive medical treatment, the obligated
county is still required to reimburse the housing county for those expenses already incurred
while incarcerated. Releasing the inmate "for the purpose of receiving medical treatment" does
not relieve the county of reimbursing the medical expenses that were already incurred. Nothing
in the amending sentence refers to the payment of future medical expenses incurred by a person
after the person is released from a § 20-604 order. And, there is nothing in the remainder of

§ 20-605 that imposes an obligation to pay for any future medical expenses.
Saint Alphonsus argues that the amendment of § 20-605 was in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in St. Alphonsus Reg'! Medical Ctr. v. Killeen, 124 Idaho 197, 858 P.2d 736
( 1993 ). That case concerned whether a sheriff has the statutory responsibility to pay for medical
expenses incurred by medically indigent pretrial detainees in his custody. This Court ultimately
held that the sheriff and custodial county are responsible for payment of medical expenses
incurred by a person in the sheriffs custody, regardless of whether the person is indigent. Id.,
p. 200, 739. The Killeen Court held: "Because the statutes provide that the sheriff and the county
are responsible only for those in their custody, a fortiori the county need not pay for an inmate's
medical expenses incurred after that person is no longer in custody." Id. This holding is clear a county is not liable for an inmate's medical expenses incurred after the inmate is no longer in
custody.
By adding the amending sentence to§ 20-605, the legislature did not expand the holding
in Killeen to include all instances involving the release of inmates in order to receive medical

10

There are other payment programs that a provider may pursue, such as private insurance and
medical indigency programs.
12

treatment.

11

The amending sentence was added to § 20-605 which, as this Court held, only

pertains "to the housing of prisoners in another county...." County of Bannock v. Pocatello,
110 at 295, 965.

The addition of the sentence to § 20-605 does not change the overall

applicability of the statute, and does not make the statute applicable to instances when a county
houses its own inmates. This Court unequivocally held that § 20-612 applies to those situations.
The amending sentence therefore does not affect the rulings in County of Bannock or Killeen.

C.

Saint Alphonsus' Argument Regarding the Application of Idaho Code § 20-612 is
Misplaced.
Saint Alphonsus seems to base its argument for reversal of the District Court's decision

on that Court's analysis of Idaho Code § 20-612, stating that, "The thrust of the District Court's
decision was, simply, that§ 20-605 is inapplicable with respect to the Patient's care, because the
Patient was no longer in custody at the time the medical care was provided, and because the
patient was not housed in a different county[.]" Appellant's Brief, p. 16. Saint Alphonsus then
cites a portion of the District Court's decision, and concludes that "the District Court's analysis
abruptly and inexplicably terminates here, without further analysis of§ 20-612." Id.
Saint Alphonsus concedes the ultimate issue in this case - "Saint Alphonsus agrees that
Idaho Code § 20-605 governs out-of-county inmates, and that § 20-612 governs same-county
inmates." Appellant's Brief, p. 17. Contradictorily, Saint Alphonsus then goes on to argue that,
"However, in this instance - and with any same-county inmates - § 20-605 expressly governs
reimbursement for medical costs because § 20-612 specifically references I.C. § 20-605 with
respect to payment of medical costs[.]" Id. (emphasis in original). Saint Alphonsus contradicts
its own argument by initially conceding that § 20-605 governs out-of-county inmates, and then
11

The holding in Killeen supports the actions by Ada County and the Ada County Sheriff in this
instance. Pursuant to Killeen, the Sheriff paid for the Patient's medical bills incurred while he
was in custody, but did not pay the medical bills incurred after he was released from custody.
13

by arguing that the reference in § 20-612 to § 20-605 somehow converts § 20-605 into a statute
applicable to in-county inmates. If § 20-605 governs out-of-county inmates, then the entire
statute governs out-of-county inmates.

Section 20-605 cannot both govern out-of-county

inmates, and at the same time, apply to same-county inmates. This logic is flawed, and Saint
Alphonsus cannot cherry-pick sentences from that statute it would like applied to its benefit. 12
The logical interpretation is that the statutory term "and medical care as provided in
section 20-605, Idaho Code" refers to the provision of medical services to inmates housed in a
different county. The inclusion of the § 20-605 reference in § 20-612 was necessary to ensure
that county commissioners furnish out-of-county inmates with medical care, even though those
inmates did not originate from the housing county. Any other interpretation would be to ignore
the plain reading of these statutes, and would be in violation of this Court's clear precedent. 13

D.

Saint Alphonsus' Arguments Regarding County Indigency Laws Are Irrelevant to
the Issue Presented on Appeal.
Saint Alphonsus argues that the District Court's ruling was erroneous as it pertains to the

county indigency statutes. Saint Alphonsus states that "the District Court also held that medical

12

Saint Alphonsus makes the argument that, "Ada County cannot, on the one hand, avail itself to
the reference and incorporation of Title 31, Chapter 31 [sic] in § 31-3302, but then refuse to
acknowledge the reference and incorporation of § 20-605 into § 20-612." Appellant's Brief,
p. 18, n. 4. Ada County does not "refuse to acknowledge" that § 20-612 refers to and
incorporates § 20-605. This reference and incorporation simply does not accomplish what Saint
Alphonsus wishes it to, given that the entirety of § 20-605 applies to the housing of out-ofcounty inmates, a point conceded by Saint Alphonsus.
13
Saint Alphonsus does correctly point out that, as a premise, a sheriff must pay for the medical
expenses of an inmate in his custody pursuant to § 31-3302(3), and as confirmed by this Court in
the Killeen case. From this premise, though, Saint Alphonsus reaches the incorrect conclusion
that the sheriff and the county commissioners must pay the medical expenses of an inmate who is
not in the sheriff's custody. Saint Alphonsus ignores the pertinent language of § 31-3302(3) "and committed therefor to the county jail." In this case, the Patient was no longer "committed
to the county jail" when the medical bills in question were incurred. This position is bolstered by
the inclusion of the common language in both § 31-3302(3) and § 20-612 - "and committed
therefor to the county jail." Once an inmate is no longer committed to the county jail, the
financial responsibility of the county ends.
14

care for patient-inmates post-release would be governed under the medical indigency program."
Appellant's Brief, p. 19.

Saint Alphonsus goes on to argue that this position is in direct

contradiction to the holding in the Killeen case. However, this is a mischaracterization of this
Court's holding in Killeen, and is ultimately irrelevant to the question of whether a county is
responsible for medical bills incurred by an inmate after he is no longer committed to the jail and
custody of the sheriff.
As argued above, the Killeen Court held that the medical indigency program was not the
proper method of payment for medical bills of an inmate incurred while the inmate was in

custody. Rather, the sheriff was statutorily required to pay those charges. Importantly, Killeen
held that "the county need not pay for an inmate's medical expenses incurred after that person is
no longer in custody." Killeen, 124 Idaho at 199, 858 P.2d at 738.
In this case, Ada County takes full responsibility for the payment of the Patient's medical
bills incurred while he was in custody, as is evidenced by the fact that the Ada County Sheriff
paid those bills. Idaho's indigency program was simply an option available to Saint Alphonsus
for payment of the remainder of the Patient's charges incurred after he was released from
custody.
Saint Alphonsus, like all hospitals, has many payment options available to it. When a
patient enters its facilities and incurs medical charges, Saint Alphonsus can attempt to collect
from the patient him/herself, from private insurance, from the federal government via Medicare
or Medicaid, from a county via medical indigency statutes, and, in the case of inmates, from the
county sheriff for as long as the patient was in the sheriffs custody. 14 At one point, Saint
Alphonsus recognized at least one of these options, as it filed a third party application for
14

It is difficult to see why Saint Alphonsus would prefer that payment for a patient's medical
bills originate from a specific source, as long as it received payment.
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medical indigency assistance with the Board of Ada County Commissioners. R., pp. 72-75. For
whatever reason, Saint Alphonsus chose not to appeal the Board's denial of the application. If
Saint Alphonsus disagreed with the Board's denial, the indigency appellate scheme is designed
to rectify any deficiencies in a county board's decision. By abandoning its indigency case, Saint
Alphonsus effectively crossed off one of the more effective payment options available to it.

In an effort to justify its decision to cease to pursue a major payment source, Saint
Alphonsus attempts to paint the indigency process as unduly burdensome, and one in which it
should not have to participate. Saint Alphonsus complains that proving a medical indigency case
is "no small burden given the requirements of the medical indigency statutes." Appellant's
Brief, p. 21. However, Saint Alphonsus is no different from any of the other Idaho hospitals that
avail themselves ofthe indigency process on a regular basis.
Most importantly, though, is the fact that these medical indigency discussions are not at
all relevant to the issue Saint Alphonsus has presented to this Court to decide, nor were they
critical to the District Court's holding in this case.

E.

The Necessity for the Reimbursement Provisions of§ 20-605 is Clear.
In Idaho, every county sheriff is an independently elected county officer pursuant to

Article XVIII, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution. As such, each sheriff is limited in his authority to
the county in which he was elected. Consistent with this premise is the statutory requirement
that a county sheriff is only required to run the jail for his specific county. See Idaho Code § 312202(6). Absent the authority found in Idaho Code § 20-604, a county sheriff would have no
duty to house a neighboring county's inmates, and a judge would have no authority to require
him to do the same. However, through § 20-604, the legislature created a mechanism under
which a judge can order that a county sheriff receive an inmate from a neighboring county into
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his custody.
To avoid penalizing the county that houses the inmate, the legislature also created
§ 20-605 to clarify that the county sending the inmate must bear the costs associated with the

§ 20-604 order, even though the inmate is physically transferred to another county. In other
words, although the statute allows a judge to order an inmate to be held in a neighboring
county's jail, the order does not transfer financial responsibility for that inmate along with
custody of the inmate. This prevents the injustice of having the taxpayers from the housing
county assume financial responsibility for another county's inmate.
This statutory scheme is necessitated by the practical reality in Idaho that many rural
counties do not have their own county jail.

For example, Ada County acts as the jail for

neighboring Boise County, which has no county jail. R., pp. 85-90. Similarly, Gooding County
houses inmates for neighboring Lincoln and Camas Counties. R., pp. 112-114. Caribou County
houses inmates for Franklin, Oneida, and Bear Lake Counties, who do not have county jails. R.,
pp. 94-111. To avoid shifting the costs related to the inmate to the taxpayers of the housing
county, § 20-605 makes it clear that those costs remain with the originating county. Contrary to
Saint Alphonsus' argument, Idaho Code § 20-605 does not create any new theories of liability
for hospitals to use to recover a patient's unpaid medical bills, as it merely allocates the existing
costs between the originating county and the housing county.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the arguments contained herein, Ada County respectfully requests that this
Court uphold the decision of the District Court granting Ada County's motion for summary
judgment, and conclude that Ada County and the Ada County Sheriff are not liable for payment
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of the medical expenses incurred by the Patient after he was released from the custody of the
Ada County Sheriff.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30 th day of August, 2017.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
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